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Book Review: Presidents, Parties and Prime Ministers: How




When political science scholars first asserted the essential connection between political parties
and democracy, most of the world’s democracies were parliamentary. Yet by the dawn of the
twenty-first century, most new democracies had directly elected presidents. David Samuels
and Matthew Shugart provide a theoretical framework for analyzing variation in the
relationships among presidents, parties, and prime ministers across the world’s democracies,
revealing the important ways that the separation of powers alters party organization
and behaviour. Jack Blumenau applauds the authors’ enormous data collection project,
which examines biographical information of all prime ministers and presidents in democratic
countries from 1945 to 2007.
Presidents, Parties and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of
Powers Affects Party Organization and Behaviour. David J. Samuels
and Matthew S. Shugart. Cambridge University Press. July 2010.
 
Do polit ical constitutions matter f or democratic quality? As the green
shoots of  democracy struggle to break through in many parts of  the Arab
world, such questions have renewed relevance f or policymakers.
However, the comparative literature on presidential and parliamentary
systems has largely f ocussed on the dif f erential impact of  constitutional
choice on the survival of  democracy. While such research constitutes a
valuable normative endeavour, an impasse has f ormed between those
such as Linz, who believe that presidentialism is ‘perilous’ f or democratic
survival, and those who believe such f ears are overstated, such as
Power and Gasiorowski or Cheibub, Pzworski and Saigh. The intractability
of  this impasse constitutes a signif icant challenge to institutionalist
accounts of  comparative polit ics, and a f ailure to of f er guidance on this
most pressing issue could expose the discipline to accusations of  buck-passing.
The publication of  this new volume by David Samuels and Matthew Shugart – two heavyweights of  the
comparative presidential literature – is theref ore a welcome progression, as it attempts to move beyond
the dichotomous ‘better-or-worse’ debate, and instead f ocuses on the ef f ect of  constitutional structure
on a crucial aspect of  democratic polit ics: polit ical parties.
Samuels and Shugart argue that parties and party polit ics dif f er under dif f erent constitutional f ormats. As
they put it, polit ical parties are presidentialized by the separation of  powers. They approach their
investigation through the lens of  principal-agent analysis. In all principal-agent relationships, principals who
hire agents f ace potential agency losses – situations in which the agent’s actions diverge f rom the
principal’s interests. By characterizing the relationship between a polit ical party and the executive actor
(prime minister or president) as that of  a principal and an agent, they argue that polit ical parties in
presidential systems are more prone to agency loss than are parties in parliamentary systems. The two
most innovative expressions of  this argument are presented in chapters three and f our of  the book.
Chapter three considers the problem of  adverse selection, and argues that parties in all systems are f aced
with the dif f iculty of  selecting as leader both a loyal party servant and an election-winning f igurehead. In
parliamentary systems, the skills needed to win prime ministerial of f ice of ten correlate highly with the skills
that makes one a good party servant – such as the ability to coordinate the party’s legislative contingent,
and embodying the party vision. By contrast, in presidential systems, the qualit ies that make a potential
candidate usef ul f or pursuing party goals are not necessarily the same as the qualit ies needed to win a
presidential election – such as having a widely appealing and suprapartisan public image. At heart, the
argument here is that when voters play a direct role in electing national leaders, parties are f orced to
choose leaders who will appeal to the mass electorate, even if  these individuals are less likely to reliably
and consistently pursue party goals.
In a herculean data collection ef f ort examining biographical inf ormation of  all prime ministers and
presidents in democratic countries f rom 1945 to 2007, the authors show that presidents overwhelmingly
tend to have weaker t ies to their parties than do prime ministers. Presidents are more typically ‘outsiders’,
having less experience in high prof ile party jobs prior to their ascendance to high of f ice. Thus, they
suggest, the adverse selection problems that plague presidential parties lead to signif icant agency loss, as
‘outsiders’ presidents are more likely to stray f rom the party line and pursue policies that dif f er f rom the
goals of  their principals.
Chapter f our deals with moral hazard – the phenomenon that occurs when an agent violates the terms of  a
contract af ter it has been signed. Why is this particularly a problem f or presidential parties? For Shugart
and Samuels, presidential parties lack a mechanism through which they can get rid of  a leader who violates
a party-president contract whilst that leader is still in of f ice. While parliamentary parties are able to f ire their
leaders through practices of  parliamentary deselection, presidents are virtually immune to intraparty
deselection attempts. Thus, once gaps between principal and agent have emerged, the absence of  a
conf idence vote in presidential systems means that there is no way f or presidential parties to rid
themselves of  disobedient agents – again increasing agency losses relative to parliamentary parties. They
show that nearly a third of  prime ministers leave of f ice due to intra-party polit ics, where only one in over
two-hundred presidential changes resulted f rom intra-party polit ics. These arguments lead to a damning
conclusion of  presidential constitutions. In perhaps the strongest expression of  their view of
presidentialism, Samuels and Shugart suggest that “responsible parties as conceived in the literature
cannot exist under the separation of  powers.”
However, there are a number of  weaknesses that crucially undermine this relentlessly negative conclusion.
First, a lack of  high-prof ile party experience does not necessarily imply that “prospective agents will f ail to
pursue their promised course of  action.” For example, recent expert survey evidence by Wiesehomeier and
Benoit has shown that the ideological dif f erences between presidents and their parties vary according to
institutional variation within the presidential regime-type such as the concurrence or non-concurrence of
elections or the size of  the electoral districts.
Likewise, parties themselves can institute sub-constitutional ref orms in order to f urther mitigate adverse
selection problems. Primary elections are designed f or the express purpose of  allowing polit ical parties to
choose a presidential candidate who represents their interests, and candidates must appeal to this party
constituency bef ore they are able to appeal to a national constituency. These types of  institutional
innovations are ignored by Shugart and Samuels in their discussion, but constitute important and commonly
used remedies to some of  the problems that they associate with presidential systems.
Finally, Shugart and Samuels also overlook potential remedies to the problem of  moral hazard. If  agents f ail
to adhere to a contract, then the principal can either dismiss the agent or the principal can build saf eguards
into the original contract which limit the f reedom that the agent has to operate within. One such saf eguard
would be f or the party to control important institutions that f orm a part of  the legislative process, such as
the ability to manage the legislative agenda. If  the presidential party controls the tools of  legislative agenda
setting, the problem of  moral hazard is sharply reduced, as legislative behaviour on behalf  of  the president
that runs contrary to the pref erences of  the president’s party is largely irrelevant, as the party can always
block unpopular presidential proposals (Cox and McCubbins, 2005).
Schattschneider tells us that “modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of  polit ical parties” and thus
the impact that constitutional choice has on parties is certainly a subject worthy of  study. However, while
Shugart and Samuels take a step f orward by narrowing the f ocus to this singular f acet of  democracy, they
remain trapped by the dichotomous distinction between regime-types. By f ailing to disaggregate their
independent variable beyond a parliamentary/presidential dummy, this study leads to an unconvincing and
unsatisf ying conclusion. Our normative discussions and prescriptions f or constitutional design ought to
concentrate as much on the internal workings of  democratic systems as on the choice between presidential
and parliamentary regimes.
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